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Abstract 
 
Implementation of electricity reform has coincided with a significant decline 
in energy R&D activities. Technical progress is crucial for tackling many 
energy and environmental issues as well as for long-term efficiency 
improvement in the sector. This paper reviews the industrial organisation 
literature on innovation to explore the causes of the decline in energy R&D 
spending and shows that it was predicted by the pre-reform literature. More 
recent evidence endorses this conclusion. At the same time, R&D 
productivity and innovative output appears to have improved in both electric 
utilities and equipment suppliers, in line with general improvements in the 
operating efficiency of the sector. Despite this, a lasting decline in basic 
R&D and innovation input into basic research may negatively affect 
development of radical technological innovation in the long run. There is a 
need for reorientation of energy technology policies and spending toward 
more basic research, engaging more firms in R&D, encouraging 
collaborative research, and exploring public private partnerships. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The 1990s witnessed the emergence of electricity sector reform in many countries 
across the world. The main objective has been to improve operational and investment 
efficiency through restructuring, competition, regulatory reform, and privatisation. 
Reform has taken place against the backdrop of a broader paradigm shift from state 
ownership and centralised management of infrastructure industries, to one that favours 
decentralised structures, competition, independent regulatory oversight, and private 
ownership (OECD, 2000). In addition, technological progress facilitated the 
implementation of electricity reforms by reducing economies of scale and improving the 
efficiency of new generation plants, factors which lowered barriers to entry by reducing 
the up-front capital costs, operating costs, construction periods, and environmental 
impacts (Hirsh, 2000). 
 
It is important to analyse the effects of market-oriented reforms on research and 
development (R&D) efforts, and on innovation. This is because the primary aim of 
restructuring is to improve short to medium term efficiency and this may be offset over 
the longer term by lower rates of technical progress. However, these effects have 
received limited attention and have had little influence on policy. It had been assumed 
that private actors, competitive forces, and profit incentives would encourage the 
necessary levels of R&D efforts with greater precision and efficiency (see e.g. IEA, 
1999; USHR, 1998). 
 
However, there is evidence that implementation of electricity reform has coincided with 
a significant decline in R&D activities. Figure 1 also shows some tendency toward 
reduction in governments energy R&D budgets around the time of reform in major IEA 
countries It appears that spending in countries with the most extensive reforms (e.g. the 
UK and Spain) show a downward trend than in countries with least extensive reforms 
(e.g. Japan and France). Although total government spending in IEA countries has 
remained relatively stable since 1990s, these are substantially lower than those of mid-
1970s and mid-1980s period (IEA, 2004b). Although, there are signs of a modest 
recovery in government energy R&D spending in recent years, this does not weaken the 
need for debating the role of government spending and R&D policy in promoting 
energy technology innovation. 
 
There is less data on energy R&D spending in the private sector as, since liberalisation, 
such information has become commercially sensitive. However, indications suggest that 
also here there has been a reduction in spending on R&D by electric utilities and, to 
some extent, by the major suppliers of electric equipment (see Sanyal and Cohen, 2004; 
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Eurelectric, 2003; Defeuilley and Furtado, 2000; Margolis and Kammen, 1999; Bell and 
Schneider, 1999; Dooley, 1997). Figures 2 and 3 show that these has been a marked 
decline in R&D spending by private electric utilities in the US and Japan in the post-
liberalisation years. 
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Figure 1: Government energy R&D spending in IEA countries 
Source: IEA (2004a) 
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Figure 2: Collaborative research through EPRI 
Source: EPRI annual reports 
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Figure 3: Private electricity R&D in Japan (billion yens - estimated  
spending for 2003 and budgeted amounts for 2004). 
Source: In Hattori (2005) based on FEPCO/CEPC (2004). 
 
R&D expenditure is just one of the costs incurred by a liberalised industry. 
Liberalisation leads to cost reductions in operating expenditure and capital expenditure 
as a result of pressure on utilities to improve financial performance. This should reflect 
genuine efficiency improvements. As such lower private R&D expenditure, in the 
context of lower overall expenditure, may be part of general efficiency improvements. 
The reason for our focus on this element of costs is that private R&D expenditure has 
fallen much faster than overall expenditure in the electricity supply industry as indicated 
by the declines in R&D intensity above. This may indicate the emergence of a 
significant market failure with respect to R&D expenditure. We do not expect to be able 
to definitively conclude on the extent to which R&D expenditure is currently 
suboptimally low (or whether it was suboptimally high prior to reform), but to highlight 
low R&D expenditure as a relevant policy issue. 
 
Kamien and Schwartz (1975) show that, on the whole, there is a positive relationship 
between innovative input, such as research and development (R&D) expenditure, and 
innovation outputs. Perelman (1995) finds that total factor productivity (TFP) in the 
Organisation for Economic and Cooperation and Development (OECD) manufacturing 
sectors is correlated with R&D intensity (the ratio of R&D spending to gross domestic 
product (GDP). In the electricity sector, technological progress is a key factor for long-
term efficiency improvement and for aligning the economic and environmental 
objectives in a sustainable development framework. 
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Importance of energy R&D in the context of electricity reform is highlighted by the fact 
that about 98 percent of the R&D expenditures by countries member in International 
Energy Agency (IEA) R&D takes place in 10 major economies (Margolis and Kammen, 
1999). The major energy R&D spending countries, whether under public or private 
ownership, have embarked on some form of electricity reform and, as a result, the 
economic and environmental benefits of technological progress must increasingly be 
achieved in market-oriented environments. However, reform implementation has proved 
to be considerably more complicated than anticipated, design and policy issues remain 
to be solved, and uncertainty has increased. This is at a time when technical progress in 
flexible generation technologies, increased use of renewable sources, and distributed 
generation, can lead to new opportunities for reform. 
 
The direction of the causal effect between technological progress and reform may have 
been reversed, as there has been a marked reduction in the level of R&D activities. The 
literature is generally positive about the performance effects of liberalisation, although 
some authors raised concerns regarding the long-term effects of a decline in energy 
R&D (see GAO, 1996; Dooley, 1997; Bell and Seden, 1998; Bell and Schneider, 1999). 
Moreover, there is limited sign of coherent energy R&D and technology policies after 
deregulation. This vacuum may be partly explained by the constant short term 
challenges posed by reform which make consideration of long term effects less of a 
priority. A better understanding of the factors and mechanisms affecting energy R&D in 
a deregulated environment will be a significant contribution to formulating appropriate 
energy R&D policies. 
 
That said, there is a rich body of theoretical and empirical literature on R&D and 
technical change within the framework of an industrial organisation paradigm. Much of 
this literature was written before the recent reform period (which we date from around 
1990). Although general structural characteristics of most industries are stable over 
time, the introduction of sector reforms will affect some of these characteristics in a 
fundamental way. Therefore, examining the effect of (reform-induced) structural and 
related changes in the electricity sector is a rare opportunity to revisit and assess their 
impact on R&D conduct and industry performance. It is the thought that this literature 
might have predicted the sharp decline in R&D expenditure following liberalisation 
which is the major motivation for this paper. 
 
In what follows we examine the effect of electricity reform on energy R&D activities 
within the framework of the industrial organisation paradigm. Section 2 presents: (i) 
evidence on post-reform energy R&D efforts with an emphasis on the ten leading 
countries, (ii) relevant aspects of reform and sector policies, and (iii) outlines a model of 
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electricity reform and R&D. Section 3 is a review of the relevant R&D literature and the 
extent to which it apparently explains the relationship between electricity reform and 
R&D. Tables 3, 4 and 5 summarise the main findings of this section. Section 4 contains 
a conclusion and policy implications. Appendices expand the review summaries in 
Section 3. 
 
 
2. Energy R&D and Electricity Reform 
 
2.1 Elements of Electricity Sector Reform 
 
The accumulated experience of electricity liberalisation since the 1990s has led to the 
identification of a set of generic reform steps for a well functioning market-oriented 
sector. Liberalisation generally requires implementation of one or more of the following 
steps: sectoral restructuring, introduction of competitive markets for wholesale 
generation and retail supply, regulation of transmission and distribution networks, 
establishment of an independent regulator, and privatisation of assets (Newbery, 2002; 
Jamasb, 2002; Joskow, 1998). Table 1 outlines the main measures of a generic 
liberalisation model for transforming a vertically integrated publicly owned monopoly 
into a privately owned competitive sector. In practice, the actual measures need to be 
adapted to take the specific characteristics of a given sector into account e.g. structure, 
system size, ownership, and resource endowment, as well as the desired features of the 
liberalisation model to be implemented. 
 
 
Table 1: Main steps in electricity reform 
- Vertical unbundling of generation, transmission, 
distribution, and supply activities 
 
Restructuring 
- Horizontal splitting of generation and supply 
activities 
- Wholesale market and retail competition Competition and 
Markets - Allowing new entry into generation and supply 
- Establishing an independent regulator 
- Provision of third-party network access 
 
Regulation 
- Incentive regulation of transmission and distribution 
networks 
- Allowing new private actors Ownership 
- Privatising the existing publicly owned businesses 
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The main perceived effect of privatisation comes through incentives to pursue profit 
through cost saving and efficiency. Often, the structural effect of the change from public 
to private ownership is a shift from a single to a plural ownership mode that facilitates 
direct competition in the wholesale generation and retail supply activities, and incentive 
regulation of transmission and distribution networks. 
 
Structural changes generally involve unbundling the various functions of vertically 
integrated entities with the aim of separating the potentially competitive functions from 
natural monopoly networks. This is generally achieved by functional or legal separation. 
Restructuring can also involve horizontal splitting or merging of companies within an 
activity. Unbundling, therefore, affects both the size and concentration of firms in the 
market. Establishment of wholesale and retail markets is central to liberalisation, and 
transforms the organisation of the sector and the operating environment of companies. 
In addition, the establishment of an independent regulatory authority changes sectoral 
governance and rules of conduct for the firms in the market. The main regulatory 
functions are to ensure well functioning competitive generation and supply markets and 
non-discriminatory access to transmission and distribution networks. In many cases, the 
primary objective of the regulator is to protect the interests of the consumers while 
ensuring that investments can be financed. 
 
 
2.2 Background to liberalisation 
 
The main objective of electricity reform is to improve the efficiency of the sector. 
Empirical evidence suggests that, on balance, reforms have resulted in improved 
efficiency and cost savings (Domah and Pollitt, 2001; Jamasb et al., 2005; Newbery and 
Pollitt, 1997; Markiewicz et al, 2004). There are differing theoretical perspectives as to 
how market-based reforms and private ownership might lead to greater efficiency; 
Pollitt (2002) classifies the relevant theories as: (i) property rights theories, (ii) 
bureaucracy theories, (iii) influence theories, (iv) economic regulation theories, and (v) 
commitment theories. On balance, theory predicts that reforms will lead to higher 
efficiency. 
 
Hart et. al. (1997) suggest that public ownership is superior to private ownership only in 
a narrow range of circumstances. Megginson and Netter (2001), in their assessment of 
empirical studies of privatisation world-wide, conclude that there is strong evidence that 
privatisation improves operating performance, however, ineffective regulation and a 
lack of government commitment may negate the expected benefits of reform. Galal et 
al. (1994) stress that arguments explored by property rights, public choice, and 
 7
bureaucracy theories are not applicable to all market structures. De Fraja (1993) shows 
that, within the framework of principal-agent theory, public enterprise performance 
evaluation and optimal contracts can be more efficient than the profit incentive of 
private firms. Pint (1991) suggests that both public enterprises and regulated private 
firms are less efficient than the second-best efficient solution in natural monopoly; the 
former by excessive use of labour and the latter by excessive use of capital. 
 
Schneider and Jäger (2003) identify three theoretical approaches that attempt to explain 
the recent trend toward the withdrawal of the state from infrastructure industries. (i) 
Dynamic theories of diffusion and contagion emphasise the co-evolution and 
intertwining of national policy making through (inter-sectoral and general economic) 
embededness into an international environment. (ii) Structuralist and functionalist 
theories of economical and technological determination stress the inevitability of the 
withdrawal of the state as a consequence of structural changes from global economic 
integration and technological evolution. (iii) Actor-centred and institutionalist theories 
of political scope of action reject the notion of the inevitable convergence of policies 
leading to an identical withdrawal path across countries and emphasise feasibility of 
multiple and country-specific paths and models. 
 
The emergence of the liberalisation paradigm of infrastructure industries may be 
explained in terms of pull and push theories and the arguments discussed in the above. 
At the same time, the positive macroeconomic effects of liberalisation may yet need to 
be established. Historically, as Chang (2003) points out, in all developed economies 
interventionist policies played an active role, and there is no theoretical reason for a 
more liberalised economy achieving higher allocative efficiency, or for higher allocative 
efficiency leading to higher economic growth. Indeed Oulton (1995) suggests that the 
UK economy was characterised by low growth in the 1980s and early 1990s because the 
positive effects of liberalisation were offset by poor macro-economic management. 
 
 
2.3 Why reform might impact energy R&D 
 
This section examines the possible effects of electricity liberalisation on energy R&D 
within the industrial organisation perspective using the structure--conduct-performance 
(SCP) paradigm of industrial organisation. We focus on the most commonly 
implemented reform steps that are likely to have a considerable impact on R&D 
activities. 
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The crucial task in implementing electricity reform is how to provide the necessary 
conditions for efficient operation and investments in a sector that is characterised by: (i) 
large sunk costs, (ii) a mixture of competitive and natural monopoly activities, (iii) 
organised markets with instantaneous physical balance of supply and demand, and (iv) 
delivery of a non-storable good.1 
 
Theory suggests that competition and profit incentives result in internal (product) and 
external (market) efficiency and that the gains from these are passed to customers and 
the economy in the form of lower costs and prices. In principle, R&D investments 
should play a central role in product and process innovation and achieving competitive 
advantage in the market. However, R&D often has some characteristics of public goods 
that limit the scope of private involvement in these. The potential for the occurrence of 
spill-overs and limits to appropriation of results reduce potential returns from R&D to 
private investors. In addition, uncertainty about the outcome of R&D investments tend 
to have a negative effect of R&D spending. These factors lead to lower than optimum 
R&D investments from a social point of view. Further, the existence of network 
externalities implies that the system-wide costs and benefits do not always coincide. 
 
In the light of theory and evidence it is plausible that electricity liberalisation can 
achieve (short-term) operating efficiency through the spread of best practice. The 
logical extension of the above argument is that liberalisation will also lead to improved 
(mid-term) investment efficiency and adoption of best available technologies. A further 
extension of this logic suggests that firms will also have the incentive to engage in 
development of new technologies to gain competitive advantage in the asset base and 
operation through R&D. Indeed, the greatest potential for efficiency improvement in the 
sector lies in long-term technical progress that expands the boundaries of possibilities 
and achieves a positive shift in the efficient frontier. However, it is less clear whether, 
due to the particular characteristics of the sector, such a sequence of logical arguments 
and predictions will, in reality, hold and deregulation will result in higher long-term 
technical progress than the pre-reform models. This may be because de-regulation 
systemically lowers the willingness of the sector to take technological risks and results 
in the favouring of the use of established technologies with low up front capital costs. 
 
The main focus of the early economic literature on science and technology was on the 
impact and measurement of technological change on output and growth. A common 
characteristic of these studies was their treatment of technical change as a factor 
                                                           
1 The latter two characteristics are because of properties of electricity which are such that it can only be 
stored at relatively high cost and that in an electricity network supply must equal demand at every node at 
all times or else unacceptable variations in voltage occur. 
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exogenous to the economic system. This approach has had clear limitations in a policy 
analysis and advice perspective. Since the 1960s, the focus has shifted to the study of 
the effect of economic factors on technical change (Thirtle and Ruttan, 1987). This 
newer approach views technical change as a factor that is endogenous to the economy 
and focuses on determinants of technical change and the role of policy in achieving it. 
This view stems from recognition of the importance of technical change for economic 
growth and the desire to influence its course and rate of progress. In other words, the 
new framework assumes that technical change can be induced. The notion of induced 
technical change is relevant and appealing for addressing energy and environmental 
issues where the economic, political, and social stakes are high (Grubb et al., 2002). 
 
The different stages and processes in technical change have been described in various 
ways. The most established of these is the paradigm generally referred to as the 
Schumpeterian trilogy based on the concepts of invention, innovation, and diffusion 
(Schumpeter, 1934; 1942). In this framework, invention is described as the generation 
of new knowledge and ideas. In the innovation stage, inventions are transformed into 
new products. Finally, the diffusion stage is the widespread adoption of the new 
products. An alternative paradigm to describe technical change distinguishes between 
science and technology. Here, science broadly refers to the earlier (and non-
commercial) phases of the trilogy, while technology is associated with profit seeking 
activities and latter stages of the process. There is a degree of correspondence between 
the process of technical change and main stages of R&D comprising basic research, 
applied research, and development activities. Basic research is broadly related to the 
invention stage while applied research and development activities are related to 
innovation and diffusion phases. The relationship between the stages in the technical 
progress is not necessarily linear. Rather, the process of technical change encompasses 
various feedback loops between these components (Stoneman, 1995: 2-5). The inter-
relations and feedback in the innovation process are, however, not well understood and 
the search for a coherent theory of the determinants of technological innovation remains 
elusive.2 
                                                           
2 One approach to the measurement of technical change that has recently gained renewed attention is to 
quantify the effect of the chain of activities and interrelations leading up to technical progress and is 
based on the measurement of the learning effect using technology learning curves. The concept of the 
learning effect as a distinct source of technical change is generally termed as “learning-by doing” and was 
presented in Wright (1936) and Arrow (1963). The learning effect is generally derived from learning 
curves where technical change is expressed by the reduction in unit cost or price as a function of 
accumulated capacity or output. More recently, the notion of learning effect has been extended to include 
“learning-by-researching” where research is assumed to result in learning by enhancing the knowledge 
base, which in turn promotes technical progress. In some empirical analysis of technical change, the 
learning effect of research is accounted for in “two-factor learning curves” that use cumulative R&D 
spending or number of patents as a proxy for stock of knowledge (Kouvariatakis, 2000). 
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Recognition of induced technical progress implies that policy can play an important role 
in directing the process of change. A typology of policies, consistent with the 
framework outlined in the above divides these into supply push and demand pull 
policies. The aim of supply push policies is to promote the generation of knowledge and 
development of new technologies. In turn, market or demand pull policies are devised to 
promote technical change by creating demand and developing markets for new 
technologies and products. 
 
The specific steps aimed at implementing market-oriented electricity reforms, can have 
a profound impact on the activities and processes that lead to technical progress in the 
sector. In the light of the decline in R&D efforts in the aftermath of reforms, the market 
failure view provides a plausible framework for examining the effect of reform on R&D 
and innovation in the sector. R&D activities are subject to three main types of market 
failure namely indivisibility, uncertainty, and externalities (Ferguson and Ferguson, 
1994). Therefore, it is possible that market failure associated with reforms play a role in 
the recent decline in R&D activities. Table 2 outlines aspects of the effect of the key 
reform steps on the structure, organisation, and drivers of the sector’s innovative input 
and outputs. The table also shows the parallels with the components of the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm which form the basis of the selection and evaluation of 
the empirical and conceptual evidence reviewed in this paper. 
 
 
Table 2: A S-C-P model of electricity reform and innovative activities 
STRUCTURE CONDUCT PERFORMANCE 
Reform Steps R&D Input R&D Output 
● Restructuring (Section 3.1) 
- Firm size 
- Degree of Vertical 
integration 
 
● Ownership (Section 3.2) 
- Ownership type 
- Privatisation 
- Mergers & acquisitions 
 
● Regulation (Section 3.3) 
- Rate of return regulation 
- Incentive regulation 
- State vs. local regulation 
● R&D spending 
 
● R&D intensity 
 
● R&D organisation 
● Patenting activity 
 
● Technology adoption 
 
● Technical change 
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3. Empirical Studies of Innovation in Industrial Organisation 
 
There is an extensive empirical industrial organisation literature addressing various 
aspects of innovation. However, only a small subset of this literature covers the issue of 
innovation in electricity sector. An even smaller number of studies address innovation 
within the context of market-oriented reforms in infrastructure industries. Therefore, in 
order to enhance our understanding of the effect of electricity reform on innovation, we 
cast our net wider and review the evidence from other relevant studies. 
 
Nearly all the industrial organisation literature on innovation examines the causal 
relations for a given market/regulatory design or compares innovation across 
market/regulatory designs - for example, the effect of firm size or regulation on the 
innovative efforts of firms. However, it is uncommon that important features of the 
entities being studied are subject to change. 
 
 
3.1 Restructuring 
 
In many instances, a full scale physical restructuring requires breaking up vertically 
integrated systems through vertical separation i.e. unbundling of interconnected 
activities and horizontal splitting of the entities that are deemed too large. Unbundling 
separates the potentially competitive activities from network activities as natural 
monopolies while horizontal splitting aims to curb market power and dominance of 
large firms. Moreover, an organised wholesale market for generation needs to be 
established and barriers to new entry need to be lowered. 
 
Vertical unbundling and horizontal splitting change firm size and market concentration. 
The effects of firm size and market concentration on firms’ innovative activities are 
arguably the most widely studied aspects of the relation between market structure and 
innovation in the industrial organisation literature. However, as mentioned, this has 
almost entirely been done by comparing differences across firms and industries rather 
than in the context of the changing circumstances of the same firms and industries 
resulting from, for example, a reform.3 
 
 
                                                           
3 A notable exception is the discussion of impacts of forced vertical and horizontal separation in the US 
petroleum industry on energy R&D in the 1970s (see Teece, 1997). 
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Firm size and market concentration 
The literature on the effect of firm size and market concentration on innovative activity 
is extensive and we do not attempt to settle these questions or to survey this literature 
here. Scherer and Ross (1990), Cohen and Levin (1988), Williamson (1983), and 
Kamien and Schwartz (1975) present comprehensive reviews of the state of debate and 
evidence on these issues. On balance, surveys of the Schumpeterian hypotheses and 
their variations suggest that the theory and empirical evidence are not conclusive. 
Overall, the important and relevant lessons that emerge from this literature suggest that 
both competition and monopoly can, up to a point, encourage innovative activity. 
Therefore, in order to achieve long run technical progress, a balance must be struck with 
regards to the thresholds in the constructive forces of these factors. This balance 
between competition and monopoly, however, can vary with firm and industry specific 
characteristics. 
 
The evidence emerging from the literature testing the Schumpeterian hypotheses using 
‘within industry’ samples are more conclusive and supportive. Cohen and Klepper 
(1996) summarise these findings as: “(1) the likelihood of performing R&D rises with 
firm size; (2) R&D and firm size are closely and positively related within industries; (3) 
R&D spending rises proportionally with firm size in most industries; (4) the number of 
patents or innovations generated per dollar of R&D declines with firm size.” The study 
analyses data from 75 US industries between 1975-1977 using an R&D cost spreading 
model (i.e. large firms distribute the R&D costs over a greater number of units of 
output). The results support the findings from previous studies. In addition, the study 
shows that although R&D productivity may decline with size, large firms benefit from 
R&D cost spreading. 
 
The main causes of the post-reform decline in energy R&D can be explained in terms of 
the effect of implementation of reform steps such as restructuring on the specific 
characteristics of the electricity industry. We now turn to the limited number of the 
studies of the subject in the electricity sector. This literature is almost entirely on the US 
electricity sector and prior to the reforms in some states. This can be explained by the 
existence of a large number of privately owned regulated utilities in the US, as opposed 
to the state-owned and vertically integrated models that were dominant in most of the 
world, thus offering the opportunity to test various regulatory economics or industrial 
organisation hypotheses. 
 
Wilder and Stansell (1974) examine the determinants of R&D spending including firm 
size in US electric utilities. The study uses data from over 200 utilities involved in the 
electricity sector between 1968 and 1970. The size and involvement of utilities in the 
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electricity sector is measured by operating revenues and their share of operating 
revenues from electricity respectively. The results show that R&D outlays of utilities 
are positively correlated with their size. The coefficients are significantly greater than 
zero and one indicates that elasticity of R&D response to firm size is larger than one. 
Also, share of electricity in total operating revenues is positive and significantly 
different from zero (its difference from one is, however, insignificant) indicating R&D 
spending is more associated with electricity than other utility operations. Delaney and 
Honeycutt (1976) replicate the analysis in Wilder and Stansell after adjusting the 
sample for firms that are subsidiaries or part of joint ventures and holding companies. 
The adjustment reduced the sample size to 135 utilities and the analysis was performed 
for 1970 and 1972. Analysis of the adjusted sample confirmed the results by Wilder and 
Stansell for firm size and share of revenues from electricity. 
 
Also, two other studies of US electric utilities, Flynn and Mayo (1988) and Sanyal and 
Cohen (2004), find that firm size (measured in physical output and operating revenue 
respectively) have a positive and significant effect on their R&D spending. The latter 
study also finds that post-deregulation R&D elasticity of size is lower (0.83) than that of 
pre-deregulation period (0.96). Furthermore, Cohen and Sanyal (2004) find that internal 
and external R&D of US electric utilities increase with firm size though the effect on 
internal R&D is rather stronger. 
 
The elasticity of R&D spending with respect to size for electric utilities in the above 
studies is indicative of, at least, part of the observed reductions in R&D spending in the 
aftermath of reforms in the US and elsewhere. The estimated elasticities of R&D in 
these studies vary significantly: Wilder and Stansell (1.29-1.40), Delaney and 
Honeycutt (1.45-1.61), Flynn and Mayo (1.0), Sanyal and Cohen (0.84-0.96), and 
Cohen and Sanyal (0.87 and 1.8 for internal and external R&D respectively). Since 
vertical unbundling and horizontal splitting of utilities can reduce the size of large 
utilities significantly, these results imply possible large reductions in utility R&D 
spending as a result of restructuring. 
 
Benefits of R&D are achieved only when firms adopt the innovation output of R&D. 
Therefore, factors that affect the propensity of adopting new technology by firms are as 
important as R&D and innovation. Rose and Joskow (1990) present an econometric 
analysis of adoption of new generation technologies in the US electric utilities. The 
paper examines the effect of firm size, fuel cost, and ownership on adoption of two 
coal-fired steam-electric technologies. We return to these effects of ownership in next 
section. The study uses statistical models of hazard rate to estimate adoption probability 
of subcritical 2400 psi and supercritical above 3206 psi generation technologies 
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between 1950 and 1980. The results show that large utilities are significantly more 
likely to adopt new technologies than small firms although the relationship is non-linear 
and declining. A 10 percent increase in firm size increases the hazard rate by 7-8 
percent. The paper also finds that larger firms have greater technological opportunity for 
adopting new technologies and failure to control for this factor leads to overestimation 
of the effect of firm size on adoption of new technologies. 
 
Vertical integration 
The progress in electricity generation technologies achieved during the 1950s and 1960s 
mainly favoured larger units. It is, therefore, conceivable that large utilities were better 
positioned to benefit from the scale factor that new technologies offered (see Hughes, 
1971; Hirsch, 1999). Moreover, Hughes (1971) argues that, in the US electricity sector, 
economies of co-ordination would be best utilised in a structure that consisted of about 
twenty large vertically integrated utilities. 
 
An important argument in support of vertically integrated structures in the electricity 
sector is based on the perceived benefits of the economies of vertical co-ordination. 
Kaserman and Mayo (1991) identify market uncertainties, small numbers bargaining, 
large quasi-rents, and vertical externalities (e.g. technological externalities and moral 
hazard) as characteristics of intermediate product markets in vertically separated and 
competitive electricity sectors. Kaserman and Mayo (1991) then use data from 74 US 
electric utilities to find that the firms’ total operating expenditures are significantly 
negatively correlated with the degree of vertical integration. They also suggest that the 
economies of vertical integration are likely to be larger than benefits of operating in a 
competitive market. Other studies such as Nemoto and Goto (2004), Hayashi et al. 
(1997), Gilsdorf (1995, 1994), and Lee (1995), have found evidence of economies of 
vertical integration in electricity industry. In the UK significant re-integration of 
unbundled utilities has incurred following extensive dis-integration prior to the start of 
recent reforms (see Newbery, 2005). 
 
Kaserman and Mayo (1991) also argue that co-ordination among utilities in the form of 
being part of a holding company, participation in joint ventures, and power pooling may 
offer some of the benefits of vertically integrated structures. The results do not indicate 
significant cost savings for participation in holding companies and are thus in 
agreement with findings of Huettner and Landon (1978) and Christensen and Greene 
(1978). The study does not explicitly account for power pooling among the firms. At the 
same time, there is no evidence of significant cost saving from power pooling arguing 
that transaction costs and lack of regulatory incentives have resulted in loose 
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arrangements that have not produced significant cost savings (Christensen and Greene, 
1978; Cramer and Tschirhart, 1983; Gegax and Tschirhart, 1984). 
 
Joskow (2002) discusses electricity reform issues in the light of some characteristics of 
the sector i.e. limited adaptability of existing assets, and the apparent economies of co-
ordination in vertical integration structures. The paper argues that while reforms have 
achieved improvements in operating efficiency, their long-term benefits from resource 
allocation are yet to be determined. Joskow stresses the importance of adopting a 
transaction costs approach to design and evaluation of electricity reforms and that the 
perceived benefits of reforms need to offset the increased transaction costs resulting 
from unbundling. 
 
At a general level, if vertical integration offers benefits in terms of economies of co-
ordination for the overall operation of the firms, such benefits are also likely to be 
present in innovative activities. In an analysis of the determinants of vertical integration 
in US manufacturing industries, Levy (1985) finds evidence that research intensity 
(interpreted as transaction specificity) has a positive and significant effect on vertical 
integration. Armour and Teece (1980) examine research expenditures in the one 
hundred largest US petroleum companies for the 1954-1975 period. The study examines 
the effect of vertical integration (measured in terms of the number of primary 
production processes in which these firms are involved) on basic, applied, and 
development research expenditures. Their results show positive and significant 
correlation between degree of vertical integration and the expenditures on each of the 
types of research expenditures. 
 
Competition and uncertainty 
Calderini and Garrone (2003a) present a rare analysis of the impact of liberalisation of 
network industries on innovative activities and examine the effect of telecommunication 
sector reform in Europe on innovative efforts of firms. The paper distinguishes between 
basic and applied research activities and measures their research output in number of 
publications and number of patents respectively. The study views liberalisation as an 
institutional discontinuity with competitive pressure and uses data from 17 former 
telecommunication monopolies that were subsequently liberalised. The results indicate 
that the anticipation and arrival of liberalisation resulted in a decline in publication 
activity while patenting activities increased. These findings are interpreted as indication 
that competitive pressure can lead to ‘short-termism’ at the expense of basic research 
that represents long-term benefits. In a related study Calderini (2001) discusses that 
sudden institutional discontinuity and subsequent imbalance between basic and applied 
research can even result in abandoning of all research activities. 
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Defeuilley and Furtado (2000) review the changes in R&D spending following the 
electricity reforms in the US and UK and reach a similar conclusion. The paper argues 
that restructuring and competition have not only resulted in an overall reduction in R&D 
expenditures, but have reoriented the balance toward short-term objectives and concrete 
applications that offer comparative advantage. At the same time, long-term research 
projects with potential radical outcomes and those requiring cooperation across 
generation, transmission, and distribution activities have become less attractive. 
 
Sanyal and Cohen (2004) report a detailed econometric analysis of the effect of 
electricity sector restructuring in the US on utilities’ R&D expenditure between 1989 
and 1997. The findings indicate that the uncertainty associated with the reform process, 
measured as a deregulation index and probability of deregulation, has had a significant 
negative effect on the utilities’ R&D expenditures. The level of “effective competition”, 
measured as a weighted composite index based on 18 components, is also positively 
significant. However, some components of the competition index such as the 
“percentage of customers switching” supplier and “wholesale market model” are most 
directly associated with the actual competitive forces of the market place. 
 
Also, another component of the index ‘percentage of customers eligible for switching 
supplier’ (rather as a firm-specific characteristic that can exert competitive pressure on 
firms) shows a significant and positive effect on R&D expenditures. The remaining 
components of the effective competition index essentially represent various regulatory 
measures that are undertaken in preparation for or to facilitate the reform and are 
discussed later. A notable aspect of the results for the components of the effective 
competition index is that some of these exhibit significant but opposing (positive and 
negative) effects on R&D expenditures. Further, the results show that firm size; bond 
rating; the share of industrial sales in total sales; and the level of regulatory concern 
with lower prices have positively significant effects on R&D spending. The importance 
of size is more profound when we note that the R&D spending of US utilities is rather 
concentrated. It should also be noted that the total R&D expenditures of US utilities 
during the period of the study were declining. 
 
Jacquire-Roux and Bourgeois (2002) study the effect of liberalisation on the patenting 
activity of an international sample of large utilities (operators) and equipment suppliers 
in the electricity and petroleum sectors. They conclude that despite evidence of reduced 
R&D spending by operators and suppliers, the former industry shows a modest increase 
in patenting activities while the latter has achieved a considerable increase. 
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Joskow (2002) argues that the fact that electricity reform and market designs have 
frequently been modified has added to uncertainty in the sector. The effect of structural 
and uncertainty aspects of implementing reform, on innovation may be viewed in terms 
of level, direction, and rate of innovative activities. First, a one-off negative effect of 
restructuring and uncertainty can lead firms to adopt a lower level of R&D spending. In 
addition, restructuring renders parts of the pre-reform organisational knowledge and 
learning capacity irrelevant (Lomi and Larsen, 1999). Second, competition is likely to 
result in re-orientation of innovative efforts. Markard et al. (2004) in a survey of electric 
utilities observes a shift in the focus of R&D from technology based solutions to 
customer-oriented product and organisational innovations. Third, insofar as competition 
and uncertainty persist, R&D spending may consistently remain at a lower rate than 
otherwise.4 
 
Firms engage in collaborative research for a variety of reasons and these have been 
studied from the perspective of transaction costs, industrial organisation, and strategic 
management (Hagedoorn, et al, 2000). Cohen and Sanyal (2004) analyse the effect of 
electricity sector restructuring on the US utilities’ internal (in-house) and external 
(collaborative and outsourcing) R&D spending. They find that internal R&D declines 
with the initial uncertainty associated with reform but is positively significant with the 
arrival of actual competition. The study finds that a deregulation index (ranging 
between 0 and 3) has a negative and significant correlation with the internal R&D 
spending amounting to a marginal effect of 1.08 million at mean spending ($1.84 
million) i.e., at mean spending, moving from one deregulation level to next reduces 
internal R&D by $US1.08 million. The effective competition score shows a negative 
correlation with external R&D spending. At the same time, a one percent increase in 
competition and probability of deregulation result in 0.08 and 22 percent increase in 
internal R&D spending respectively. 
 
External R&D spending, however, increases with uncertainty from reform but declines 
when competition arrives. Deregulation index has a significant positive correlation with 
external R&D with a marginal effect of $1.55 i.e., at mean spending ($3.05 million), 
moving to next deregulation level increases external R&D by $US1.55 million. The 
effective competition score shows a negative correlation with external R&D spending. 
The coefficient for the introduction of a wholesale market is negative for internal R&D 
and positive for external R&D but neither is significant. The percentage of customers 
who switched supplier is negatively significant for internal and external R&D. The 
                                                           
4 It should be noted that, even prior to reforms, the R&D intensity of the electricity industry has 
traditionally been lower than most other industries. 
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percentage of customers eligible for switching has a positive effect on external and 
internal R&D although it is only significant for the former. Moreover, several 
components of the effective competition index show significant but opposing effects on 
internal and external R&D expenditures. However, fewer of the components of the 
index exhibit a significant effect on utilities’ total R&D expenditures. 
 
Cohen and Sanyal (2004) state that failure to account for complementarity between 
internal and external R&D can result in underestimation of the former. The study finds 
that internal R&D has a positive and significant effect on external R&D and is not 
affected by the liberalisation process suggesting that internal R&D increases the ability 
of utilities to absorb or benefit from external R&D. The effect of external R&D on in-
house R&D is, however, not significant. An additional benefit of collaborative R&D 
through major research organisations such as Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
is that the industry will be able to exert influence on the R&D agenda and direction. 
 
At the same time, the evidence on complementarity between government and industry 
funded R&D is, as surveyed in David et al. (2000), inconclusive. However, the survey 
shows that US based studies have less often found evidence of complementarity than 
the non-US studies. Mansfield and Switzer (1984) in a survey of four industries 
including electrical equipment find evidence of complementarity between government-
funded and firm-funded energy R&D expenditures. The findings of the survey suggest 
that factors such as sales, percentage of energy R&D as total, and percentage of 
government-funded energy R&D analysis show a negative and significant effect on the 
firms’ anticipated response to a cut in government-funded R&D. The study argues that 
the inter-firm variations can be explained by special government-funded projects in 
firms whose level affects the firm-funded R&D expenditures in the same direction. 
Also, Becker and Pain (2003) examine the determinants of low levels of R&D efforts in 
the UK during the 1990s. The study finds that reduction in government-financed R&D 
undertaken by private sector, weak output growth, and an increase in real effective 
exchange rate were the main reasons for decline in R&D outlay of the private sector. 
 
The analysis of the factors comprising the weighted composite competition index in 
Sanyal and Cohen (2004) is illuminating. The results for the individual components of 
the index reveal the complexity of the task and multitude of factors likely to play a role 
when competition is introduced. In addition, the statistically significant factors point to 
different directions. Recalling the difficulties in implementing competition in the sector, 
it becomes evident that the notion that market forces would bring about the efficient 
level of R&D activity, which is not a central reform aim, has been somewhat optimistic. 
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The main justifications and driving forces of reform have little direct to do with 
promoting R&D and innovation. 
 
Table 3 summarises the main findings of the literature reviewed in this section. As 
shown in the table, the main aspects of restructuring i.e. size reduction, unbundling, and 
competition and uncertainty are likely to have a negative effect on R&D spending and 
technology adoption. At the same time, competition and profit incentive will increase 
innovative output of the firms. 
 
 
Table 3: Summary – Effect of restructuring on innovation 
Restructuring Aspect  
 Reduced Firm 
Size 
Reduced Vertical 
Integration 
Increased Competition & 
Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
R&D 
Spending 
Multi-industry: 
(-) (Cohen & Kleppper, 96) 
 
Electric utilities: 
(-) (Wilder & Stansell, 74) 
(-) (Delaney & Honeycutt, 
76) 
(-) Flynn and Mayo (1988) 
(-) Sanyal & Cohen, 04) 
(-) (Cohen & Sanyal, 04) 
Petroleum: 
(-) (Armour & Teece, 
80) 
 
Electric utilities: 
(-) (Defeuilley & Furtado, 00) 
(-) (uncertainty) (Sanyal & 
Cohen, 04) 
(+) (Sanyal & Cohen, 04) 
(-) (uncertainty) (Cohen & 
Sanyal, 04) 
(+/-) (Cohen & Sanyal, 04) 
R&D 
Intensity 
 Multi-industry: 
(-) (Levy, 85) 
 
 
 
 
 
R&D Spending – 
Complementarity 
and Trade-Offs 
  Multi-industry (incl. electric 
equipment): 
(+) (Govt. R&D on private 
R&D) (Mansfield & Switzer, 84)
(Becker &Pain, 03) 
 
Electric utilities: 
(+) (internal R&D: on external 
R&D) (Cohen & Sanyal, 04) 
(-) (technology solutions: on 
customer & organisational 
solutions (Markard et al., 04) 
 
 
Innovation 
Output 
Multi-industry: 
(+) (Cohen & Klepper, 96) 
 Telecoms: 
(-/+) (Calderini & Garrone, 03a) 
 
Electricity equipment suppliers: 
(+) (Jacquire-Roux & Bourgeois, 
02) 
In
no
va
tio
n 
M
ea
su
re
 
Technology 
Adoption 
Electric utilities: 
(-) (Rose & Joskow, 90) 
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3.2 Ownership – Privatisation and M&As 
 
Historically, for both economic and political reasons, infrastructure industries have been 
largely under public ownership and control. Most reforms have involved some form of 
privatisation and private sector participation through the divestiture of assets or transfer 
of managerial control. In addition, following liberalisation, many private, privatised, 
and publicly owned utilities have engaged in domestic and cross-border M&As. This 
has even been true in the US where traditional privately owned utilities have 
experienced a large number of takeovers since 1992 (see Kwoka and Pollitt, 2005).  
Although there is an emerging body of literature on the various impacts of privatisation, 
including in the electricity sector, the R&D and innovation implications of ownership 
impacts of reform such as privatisation and mergers and acquisitions has generally not 
been addressed. 
 
Privatisation 
Privatisation is not a prerequisite for restructuring, the introduction of competition, or 
regulatory reform.5 However, a combination of economic ideology and anticipation of 
proceeds from the sale has meant that privatisation has become a major reform step and, 
to some extent, has become an objective rather than a means to the end. Privatisation 
changes the characteristics of owners and corporate governance, and alters responses to 
external factors such as capital markets and regulators. The interaction between these 
internal and external factors in turn influence objectives and strategies for R&D and 
innovation.6 Since privatisation has often been accompanied by the introduction of 
competition and regulation, it is difficult to separate out the effects of privatisation 
alone. 
 
Many state-owned companies reduced R&D expenditures before privatisation in order 
to maximise government proceeds. The long-term nature of R&D expenditures, and the 
inherent uncertainty of outcomes, make these suitable candidates for quick cost cutting, 
so increasing short-term profitability (Munari and Sobrero, 2003b). For example, some 
privatisation programmes in the European Union countries coincided with their 
governments’ need to reduce public deficits in order to comply with the fiscal 
requirements of European monetary union (Easterly and Servén, 2003). 
                                                           
5 In Norway, the electricity reform did not involve privatisation of the sector dominated by a large 
number of state, county, and municipality owned utilities. Elsewhere, at the time of reform in the US or 
Japan private ownership was already the dominant mode of ownership. 
6 See Munari and Sobrero (2003a) for a review of the role of corporate governance in innovative 
activities. 
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Munari and Sobrero (2003b) look at the effect of privatisation on R&D and patent 
activity for 35 privatised European companies from 11 industries. The study finds that 
R&D expenditure is significantly and positively correlated with size, privatisation 
(dummy variable), and leverage, but is negatively correlated with the private share in 
the company. Also, R&D intensity of the firms are significantly and positively 
correlated with privatisation and significantly negatively correlated with private share in 
these firms. In addition, the study finds some evidence of the positive effect of 
privatisation and private ownership share in the firms on patenting activity. Further, the 
results show that R&D spending of regulated monopolies is negatively and significantly 
correlated with the privatisation. This is in line with indications from the electricity 
distribution utilities, most of which have been subject to incentive regulation following 
privatisation. Regulators adopting incentive regulation have been mainly concerned 
with making the new regulatory regime work; promotion of R&D activities has not been 
a priority. In the absence of explicit and targeted incentives, many utilities have 
significantly reduced their R&D spending. The electricity regulator in Britain has 
recently taken steps to reverse this through establishing an Innovation Funding 
Incentive of 0.5% of the revenue of regulated electricity distribution companies (Ofgem, 
2004). 
 
Gugler (2003) reports an econometric analysis of R&D expenditure, dividends, and 
investments for a panel of 214 Austrian firms from various industries (consisting of 
state, family, bank, and foreign owned firms) using a simultaneous system of equations 
for the 1991-99 period. The results suggest that, for R&D-spending firms, investments 
and R&D are mutually, significantly and negatively correlated indicating internal 
competition for funds. In addition, R&D spending and dividends are mutually, 
negatively though not significantly correlated, while investments and dividends are 
significantly and negatively correlated and therefore compete for funds. The study also 
finds that R&D expenditures are positively correlated with the firms’ balance of cash, 
size (measured in sales), and number of patents for which they applied. 
 
The study does not explicitly examine the effect of ownership type on R&D 
expenditure, but it reports that these firms, more than one-third of which are publicly 
owned companies utilities (mostly electric utilities) are most likely to engage in 
dividend smoothing and most reluctant to cut dividends. It is conceivable that many 
newly privatised companies face an increased level of internal competition for funds 
similar to the firms in this study. 
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Munari et al. (2002) presents a theoretical framework for how economic, political, and 
cognitive factors associated with privatisation can lead to profound changes in the 
organisation and objectives of R&D in privatised firms. The main changes occur in the 
form of reductions in R&D expenditures, a shift towards applied and commercial 
projects, and restructuring of collaborative activities. The study examines four 
privatised companies, including the partial privatisation of ENEL, the Italian state-
owned electricity company. The change in the company’s operating environment and 
shift of R&D focus is reflected in the company’s mission statement before and after 
privatisation and is indicative of this transformation. The pre-privatisation mission 
statement, with regards to R&D, emphasises “…technical and scientific progress of the 
Italian electricity system…” while the aim of the post-privatisation statement is “to 
directly contribute to company competitiveness focusing on innovative solutions…”. 
 
In response to vertical separation of ENEL’s generation, transmission and distribution 
activities, the corporate R&D efforts were redefined along the lines of these now 
distinct areas of business. R&D allocation as a share of total corporate sales declined 
from 2.2 percent to 1.8 percent, and the share of long-term R&D projects fell from 60 to 
20 percent of the total. The share of R&D projects funded by operating divisions rose 
from 40 to 80 percent. 
 
The increased focus on applied and short-term research, combined with emphasis on 
commercialisation of research results, evidently led to an increase in patent activity. In a 
similar study of the privatisation of the same four firms above and two French firms, 
Munari (2003) shows that, in general, these firms exhibited an increase in their post-
privatisation innovative output measured in terms of number of patents per researcher. It 
is conceivable that increased commercial orientation and patent activity in privatised 
firms also leads to faster adoption of new technologies. Rose and Joskow (1990) in their 
analysis of US electric utilities find that private utilities were more likely to adopt two 
new generation technologies and co-operative and government owned utilities had 
lower hazard rate between 44 and 51 percent. 
 
Electricity sector privatisation and reform has occurred at a time when theory and 
empirical evidence on the relative efficiency of public vs. private ownership in general, 
and in the sector in particular, is inconclusive (Jamasb et al, 2004; Pollitt, 1995). 
Privatisation of generation and supply activities has often been followed by introducing 
competition in the wholesale and retail markets, while privatisation of transmission and 
distribution networks has involved independent regulation. The effect of privatisation of 
the electricity industry in the UK on the firms’ R&D spending sheds some light on this. 
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More than a decade since the liberalisation in 1990, the R&D spending of major non-
nuclear generators continued to decline in the 2000s (DTI, 2004). 
 
For the transmission network owner and operator NGC, R&D spending has decreased 
significantly.7 Moreover, R&D intensity measured as R&D spending as a percentage of 
turnover for the fourteen distribution network operators in the UK, in 2001-2 and 2002-
03, has been estimated at 0.1 percent. This compares to 2.5 percent R&D intensity for 
GDP as a whole (OFGEM, 2004). In the generation market, the new private entrants as 
independent power producers (IPPs) do not seem to engage in R&D efforts. In addition, 
the major UK generators have, since late 1980s, considerably reduced their R&D 
engagements (MacKerron and Watson, 1996) and cut these by at least 45% between 
1988/9 and 1994/5 (Eurelectric, 2002). 
 
Mergers and acquisitions 
The liberalisation trend began in the early 1990s in the UK, Norway and New Zealand 
and, by late 1990s, many developed and developing countries were reforming their 
electricity sectors. Within a few years, a market for electricity assets at domestic, 
regional, and global levels emerged. Indeed, the new market for electricity assets 
appeared to develop faster than the electricity product market itself. 
 
The new entities emerging from unbundled firms needed to devise strategies suitable for 
their new operating environment. An important part of such strategies was how to 
position the firm in the new global market place and (re)match their assets in the light of 
the new threats and possibilities. A wave of M&As followed in the aftermath of the 
liberalisations in which even some state-owned companies participated and expanded 
beyond their domestic and regional markets. It is unclear whether privatisation generally 
results in higher leverage. However, the post-privatisation capital requirements for new 
investment and acquisitions are likely to lead to higher levels of leverage. Higher 
leverage level and cost of capital to private owners can result in more internal 
competition for funds between R&D and other spending. 
 
There are no specific empirical studies on the effect of electricity sector M&As, but 
there is a body of literature on how M&As impact a firms’ innovative activities. 
Calderini and Garrone (2003b) review the recent literature (see also Cassiman et al., 
2004) and point to a negative relationship between financial leverage and R&D 
intensity. The possible reasons for this are that some firms that are privatised or are 
                                                           
7 It should be noted that NGC’s R&D expenditures are subject to regulatory approval. 
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subject to competition, need to undertake financial restructuring or engage in mergers 
that result in a higher level of leverage. 
 
Hall (1990), in a study of corporate restructuring in the US manufacturing industries 
between 1982 and 1987, finds that increased leverage had a significant and negative 
correlation with R&D spending. Moreover, the results show limited support for the 
hypothesis that R&D intensity declines as a result of acquisitions, and concludes that 
the small declines observed are due to increased leverage rather than to acquisitions. 
This result, however, contrasts with finding of NSF (1989) that among the top 200 
R&D-spending firms between 1984 and 1986, 24 were involved in mergers or 
restructuring and their R&D spending declined by 5.3 percent, while spending of other 
firms in the sample increased by 4.5 percent. 
 
Also, Calderini, et al. (2003) study 19 US firms in the information and communications 
technology industries acquired between 1989 and 1992. The findings suggest that after 
acquisitions, mostly horizontal and technologically unrelated, the innovative output of 
targeted firms in terms of patenting activity declined relative to a control group of non-
acquired firms. Hitt et al. (1991) found that acquisitions have a negative impact on 
R&D intensity and patent intensity of acquiring firms. In addition, diversifying 
acquisitions showed a negative impact on patent intensity. 
 
Calderini and Garrone (2003b) review the evidence on the effect of economies of scale 
and scope (i.e. M&As involving similar and diverse firms respectively) on R&D. The 
evidence on effect of scale economies on R&D suggests “neutral/negative effect on the 
input side and a positive/neutral effect on the output side”. Moreover, the evidence on 
economies of scope generally shows positive effect from diversifying acquisitions, 
possibly due to positive externalities. This finding is also relevant for electric utilities, 
as these have engaged in vertical and horizontal as well as diversifying M&As with 
other infrastructure industries (e.g. gas and water), to benefit from the perceived 
synergies of multi-utilities. 
 
Cassiman et al (2004) view the effects of M&As on R&D with a view of technological 
and market relatedness between acquiring and acquired firms. The paper surveys 31 
cases of M&As to examine the effect of technological complementarity vs. substitution 
and rivalry vs. non-rivalry of the parties in mergers on R&D performance and a set of 
measures of R&D process. The study finds that the mergers between technologically 
complementary firms show higher (not significant) R&D activity while technologically 
substitutive firms reduce R&D significantly. Increases in R&D efficiency are larger in 
mergers with technologically complementary firms than those with substitutive 
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technologies. Merging rival firms are less likely to enter new R&D areas, while non-
rival firms show higher R&D output and productivity than merging rival firms. For 
technologically substitutive merging firms, the R&D decline is larger and the R&D 
efficiency gain is smaller for merging rival firms than it is for non-rival firms. A related 
question follows as to whether cross-border M&As in the electricity sector have also 
contributed to the decline in R&D activities. Shen and Reuer (2004) in a study of 
acquisition of entrepreneurial firms, show that there is a significant negative correlation 
between the spatial dispersion of the firms and R&D intensity. It may be that mergers 
are cutting out wasteful duplication of R&D expenditure. 
 
Sanyal and Cohen (2004) in analysis of the R&D expenditure in the US investor-owned 
utilities between 1989 and 1997, find that the dummy variable for pending mergers 
showed a significant and negative impact on the probability of firms deciding to engage 
in R&D. Cohen and Sanyal (2004) find that pending mergers have a negative impact on 
internal R&D expenditures and a positive effect on external R&D expenditures, 
although these are insignificant in both cases.  
 
Table 4 summarises the main findings of the literature on innovation and ownership 
discussed in this section. 
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Table 4: Summary – innovation and ownership 
Ownership Aspect  
Increased Privatisation & 
Private Ownership 
Increased Mergers & 
Acquisitions 
Increased Leverage, 
Investment, Dividend, etc. 
 
 
 
R&D 
Spending 
Multi-industry: 
(+/-) (Munari & Sobrero, 
03b) 
 
Privatised regulated 
monopoly: 
(-) (Munari & Sobrero, 03b) 
(-) Munari et al., 02) 
 
Multi-industry: 
(-) (NSF, 89) 
 
Survey: 
(-/neutral) (Calderini & 
Garrone, 03b) 
(-/+) (Calderini et al, 03) 
 
Electric utilities: 
(-) (Sanyal & Cohen, 04) 
Multi-industry: 
(+) (Munari & Sobrero, 03b). 
(-) Investments & dividends 
(Gugler, 03) 
 
(+) Balance of cash (Gugler, 
03) 
(-) Leverage (Hall, 90) 
 
 
R&D 
Intensity 
Multi-industry: 
(+) Privatisation (Munari & 
Sobrero, 03b). 
 
(-) Private share (Munari & 
Sobrero, 03b) 
 
Survey: 
(-) M&As (leverage effect) 
(Calderine & Garrone, 03b) 
 
Multi-industry: 
(-) (Hitt, et al., 91) 
(-) (Shen & Reuer, 04) 
Multi-industry: 
(-) (Munari & Sobrero, 03b) 
 
 
R&D 
Activity 
Multi industry: 
(+) applied/commercial 
R&D (Munari et al., 02) 
  
 
Patenting 
Activity 
Multi-industry: 
(+) (Munari & Sobrero, 03b)
(+) (Munari, 03) 
Multi-industry: 
(-) (Calderini et al, 03) 
(-) (Hitt, et al., 91). 
(+) (Calderini & Garrone, 03b)
Multi-industry: 
(+) (Gugler, 03) 
In
no
va
tio
n 
M
ea
su
re
 
New 
Technology 
Adoption 
Electric utilities: 
(+) (Rose & Joskow, 90) 
  
 
 
3.3 Regulation 
 
Reform-relevant literature on the effect of regulation on R&D and innovation is 
somewhat limited due to the fact that, in most countries prior to the introduction of 
reforms, the notion of independent regulation did not exist. The largest share of the 
existing literature is within the context of utility regulation in the US where there is a 
long-established tradition of privately-owned infrastructure industries subject to 
independent federal and state level regulation. But even in the US, due to differences in 
the restructuring of the industry, it is rather difficult to learn from the insights of the 
empirical literature and conceptualise the possible overall R&D effects of the reform-
related regulatory changes. 
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A few studies have focused on the effects of regulation on technical change in the 
electricity sector. Technical change may be regarded as an observable measure or 
indicator of performance or outcome of R&D input and output, diffusion, and 
innovation adoption. Smith (1974) extends the Averch-Johnson theoretical model of 
regulated firm to show that ROR regulation not only offers incentives to over-capitalise, 
but can also lead to the adoption of labour augmenting technologies and under-
investment in capital augmenting technologies.8 However, the paper points out that, to 
the extent that regulated firms are not vertically integrated in R&D i.e. they cannot exert 
control over the innovation agenda, this effect may be reduced. The paper argues that in 
the US electricity industry where most R&D was undertaken by equipment 
manufacturers and the federal government, the rate of technical change was faster than 
in other industries. 
 
Frank (2003) analyses the technical change in electric utilities in Texas before and after 
the transition from loose local and municipal regulation to state ROR regulation in 
1975. The study estimates technical progress at 1.24% per year between 1965 and 1974, 
as opposed to a technical regress at -0.72% per year between 1975 and 1985 after the 
introduction of ROR regulation. Frank (2003) is in agreement with the model in Smith 
(1974) and finds evidence of over-capitalisation and adoption of labour augmenting 
technologies in the utilities. Granderson (1999) examines the effect of regulation on 20 
US inter-state natural gas pipeline companies against the case of a theoretical 
deregulation of the industry, and finds that regulation results in adoption of non-capital 
augmenting technologies and a small decline in the rate of technical change. 
 
Nelson (1984) estimates the effect of capital vintage and regulation on technical change 
in the US electric utilities between 1951 and 1978, and finds that the dominating share 
of technical change stems from capital vintage represented by a vintage index and time 
trend variable. The effect of regulation, however, measured as allowed rate of return 
(ROR), appears to be very small. The study suggests that policies favouring specific 
types of generation technologies have been more effective than ROR regulation in 
promoting R&D. 
 
In two studies of the innovation efforts of the US electricity utilities between 1968 and 
1972, Wilder and Stansell (1974) and Delaney and Honeycutt (1976) examine whether 
the type of regulation affects the utilities’ R&D outlays. Both studies report that the 
dummy variable representing type of regulation, i.e. state versus municipal level 
                                                           
8 Westfield (1971) uses a different approach to modelling resource augmentation under regulation, which 
indicates that over-capitalisation tendency among rate of return regulated firms also extends to a 
preference for capital augmenting technologies. 
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oversight is insignificant. Mayo and Flynn (1988) examine the effect of regulation on 
R&D in US electric utilities for 1975 and 1983. The regulation variables used are 
allowed ROR and a dummy variable for whether R&D spending have been allowed in 
the rate base in order to represent the lower and upper end of distribution of returns to 
R&D respectively. The results for 1983 shows that both variables are positively 
significant and each point increase in ROR on common equity (at mean level) showing 
an estimated elasticity of 1.07. For 1975, the allowed ROR, which could be regarded as 
non-binding i.e. utilities could (and as many did) earn a lower than granted rate of 
return, is not significant. 
 
Bailey (1974) using a model shows that innovative activity of a regulated firm increases 
with the length of regulatory lag, but it will take longer for the society to benefit from 
the progress. The results suggest that while increased ease of innovation encourages 
innovative activity, higher cost of research and higher discount rate will reduce it. Also, 
higher elasticity of demand requires longer regulatory lags to promote innovative 
activity. In a related paper, Sweeney (1981) shows by way of a model, that regulated 
firms may slow down or choose the timing for adoption of innovation to increase profits 
across the regulatory lag. This incentive property of the regulatory lag is not restricted 
to savings from innovation and can apply to timing of cost savings in general. It should 
be noted that propensity of regulatory lags to encourage strategic behaviour in the form 
of timing cost savings is rather similar under both ROR and price cap regulation.9 
 
Although some innovation properties of ROR regulation have been examined, the 
relative effect of ROR versus price cap regulation on the rate of technical change has 
not been studied in detail. Magat (1976) uses a conceptual model to compare the rate of 
technical change under ROR, ceiling price, and mark-up regulation regimes, and shows 
that ceiling price regulation results in a faster rate of technical progress than under no 
regulation and mark-up regulation.10 In addition, with Hicks-neutral technical change, 
the rate of innovation under ceiling price regime will be higher than under ROR 
regulation. Cohen and Sanyal (2004) show that performance-based pricing (in the form 
of a ceiling price and/or ROR regulation with profit sharing hybrid for network utilities) 
and divestiture of generation assets have both negative and significant effects on 
utilities’ internal and external R&D expenditures. 
                                                           
9 For example, the UK electricity regulator Ofgem has estimated that, under the current distribution price 
control, companies retain 27% of the present value of a cost reduction made in the first year of a control 
period but only 6% of the present value of an equal cost saving made in the final year (Ofgem, 2003). 
10 Here, the ROR regulation assumes that the regulator sets the maximum allowed return. Ceiling-price 
regulation assumes a regulated price lower than unconstrained monopoly price but high enough to allow a 
nonnegative profit and promotes cost minimisation. Markup regulation assumes a maximum permissible 
markup on total costs that is lower than the markup earned by an unconstrained profit maximising firm. 
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Engaging in R&D and adopting new technologies requires capital expenditure. At the 
same time, the Averch-Johnson effect tends to result in over-capitalisation under rate of 
return regulation. Similarly, allowing for inclusion of R&D outlays in the rate base is 
expected to lead to higher R&D efforts as it reduces financial risk. We have also seen 
indications of a positive effect of allowed ROR on R&D outlays. However, increasing 
ROR is not an effective policy tool to induce technical progress as its effect on 
innovation is indirect. 
 
There is an increase in the use of the price cap regulation model for regulating 
electricity networks. In liberalised electricity sectors, only distribution and transmission 
networks tend to be subject to price cap regulation. The best-known example of the use 
of price cap regulation in electricity networks is the case of the UK sector. Capital 
expenditure plans by utilities, arguably the most relevant spending item for R&D, 
require regulatory approval in the UK. Therefore, while price caps in principle can 
encourage R&D, the current model does not explicitly promote this incentive. 
 
It is conceivable that, under a price cap, companies will first attempt to achieve cost-
savings through managerial and organisational efforts. However, over time the X-
inefficiency is reduced. Having utilised these sources of efficiency improvement, 
technical change is increasingly the likely source of long-term efficiency improvement. 
Some of the main areas in which post-reform network systems are in need of technical 
progress are quality of service, distributed generation, and intermittency of some new 
generation sources. An issue here is whether some companies will free ride on other 
companies’ long term risky investments knowing that much of the knowledge generated 
is likely to be diffused quickly. Table 5 summarises the main findings discussed in this 
section. 
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Table 5: Summary – innovation and regulation 
  Regulation Aspect 
 ROR 
Regulation as Policy Tool 
State vs. Local 
Regulation 
Introduction of Incentive 
Regulation and Lengthening 
of Regulatory Lag 
 
R&D 
Spending 
 
Electric utilities: 
(+) Technology policy more 
effective than ROR (Nelson, 
84) 
(+) (R&D in rate base) (Mayo 
& Flynn, 88) 
Electric utilities: 
(-/neutral) (state regulation 
(Wilder & Stansell, 74; 
Delaney & Honeycutt, 76) 
Electric utilities: 
(-) Incentive regulation 
(Cohen & Sanyal, 04) 
 
Innovative 
Activity 
  Model: 
(+) (regulatory lag) (Bailey, 
74) 
(+) (regulatory lag) (Sweeney, 
81) 
 
 
 
Adoption of 
New 
Technology 
Model: 
(+) (labour augmenting 
technologies), (-) capital 
augmenting technologies 
(Smith, 74). 
Electric utilities: 
(+) (labour augmenting 
technologies), (-) capital 
augmenting technologies 
(Frank, 03) 
 
Gas pipelines: 
(+) (non-capital augmenting 
technologies) (Granderson, 99) 
  
In
no
va
tio
n 
M
ea
su
re
 
 
Technical 
Change 
 
Electric utilities: 
(+/small) (Nelson, 84) 
Electric Utilities: 
(-) (state regulation) (Frank, 
03; Granderson, 99) 
Model: 
 (+) ceiling-price (Magat, 76) 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper has examined the likely structural origins of the decline in R&D spending 
that resulted from electricity reform. Technical progress has been on the margins of the 
electricity reform process, and has neither constituted a driving force nor an objective. 
The anticipation of positive effects from deregulation on innovative efforts has been 
indirect and implicit, and therefore ‘uncertain’. Our examination of the theory and 
evidence suggests that the decline in R&D spending in the electricity sector was 
predictable. Indeed with hindsight, it can be claimed that the pre-reform literature 
contained sufficient indications to predict a reduction in energy R&D spending. 
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By introducing competition and unbundling and by extending private ownership in the 
electricity sector, liberalisation has subjected the industry to the generally recognised 
incidence of market failure in R&D spending. We identified several dimensions to the 
causes of decline in R&D in the sector. These include the negative effect of size where 
large firms are split up and activities are separated. Market competition and increased 
uncertainty, at least initially, also lead to lower R&D spending levels. It is too early to 
judge whether, in the long-term, the industry will find a sufficiently profitable private 
return in R&D to justify a higher level of expenditure than at present. 
 
To the extent that privatisation has lead to increased leverage and pressure for short-
term profitability, these are likely to have contributed to a cut back in R&D spending 
budgets. Mergers and acquisitions have likely had the same effect, though vertical 
mergers provide a notable exception. In addition, the incentive properties and regulatory 
lag in price cap regulation, often implemented in conjunction with reform, are not likely 
to promote R&D investment unless these enter the asset base. 
 
Reduction in government R&D spending is likely to result in less private R&D which in 
turn leads to lower in-house and collaborative R&D spending. We also saw that intra-
firm competition for resources between investments, dividend and R&D is likely to 
disfavour the latter. Collectively, in many instances, the above factors result in lower 
private returns of many R&D programs than social and/or profitable returns. 
 
At the same time, R&D productivity and innovative output per unit of input, such as 
patenting and organisational adjustment, appears to have improved. This finding is both 
intuitive and in line with general improvements in the operating efficiency of the sector. 
Despite this apparent increase in innovative outputs, a lasting decline in basic R&D and 
innovation input in basic research may negatively affect development of radical 
technological innovations in the long run. 
 
Policy implications 
A simple remedy to market failure in basic research and development and diffusion 
stages of the innovation process, as in other vital industries, is through positive 
intervention. The issue is how to do adapt this to the needs of the electricity industry 
without returning to some of the well known problems of the past such as the strong 
bias in the UK to wasteful domestic nuclear R&D expenditure widely acknowledged to 
have not produced long term benefits (see Henderson, 1977 and Green, 1995). 
 
The exact nature of government intervention aimed at the promotion of technical 
progress remains elusive and the subject of extensive debate. However, in the light of 
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wide-ranging reform-related structural, market, governance, and ownership changes, 
government intervention in market-oriented settings will need to be different from those 
in pre-reform settings. There are good reasons to think that, for the foreseeable future, 
competitive electricity markets will deliver sub-optimal amounts of R&D input and 
output. There is, therefore, a need for reorientation of energy technology policies 
towards more basic research and public private partnerships. 
 
As discussed in Fri (2003), it is inherently difficult for the government to pick the 
winning energy technologies. Successful technologies are generally incremental rather 
than disruptive, and this suggests that intervention could be more effective when aimed 
at removing specific obstacles to technical progress rather than following broad base 
policies. Government programmes may, in some cases, be able to introduce a 
technology to the market and promote its diffusion through regulation and other 
measures. The challenge is, however, to promote R&D in ways that can harness the 
power of the private sector to minimise development costs and to select good projects. 
 
Liberalisation has shown that the post-reform industry responsive to incentives – both to 
profit incentive in competitive activities and those of incentive regulation of natural 
monopoly networks. Many types of R&D in the electricity industry require large-scale 
and long-term program that can best be achieved through collaborative research. Public 
support and incentives can be effective at promoting socially desirable programs and 
contribution to and participation in joint efforts. The tendency among some 
governments has been to finance subsidies for promotion of renewable energy from 
special taxes on electricity rather than from general taxation. This approach can be also 
extended to financing subsidies to promote R&D. The recent policy by the regulator in 
Britain earmarking one-half percent of distribution utility revenues for innovation 
programs is an example in case. 
 
As we noted, R&D active firms tend to be more efficient, and more firms (incl. 
manufacturers) should be made R&D active. Government intervention should, where 
possible, promote internal and collaborative effort. In addition, market forces and trends 
in technical progress need to be assessed continuously for possible intervention. Some 
levels of R&D tax credits and subsidies can stimulate private R&D though large 
subsidies may crowd out private R&D spending. 
 
Finally, there is a need for more empirical research to determine whether the changes in 
innovative activity are a temporary or a lasting feature of deregulation. We also need to 
enhance our understanding of innovation in general and how to promote innovation in 
deregulated network industries in particular. 
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Appendix 1: Expanded Summary Tables 
 
Table A3: Expanded summary - innovation and restructuring 
Restructuring aspect  
Firm 
Size 
Vertical 
Integration 
Competition & 
Uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R&D 
Spending 
Multi-industry: 
- Likelihood and proportion of 
R&D spending within 
industries increases with size 
(Cohen & Kleppper, 96). 
 
Electric utilities: 
- R&D spending positively 
correlated (with size (Wilder & 
Stansell, 74; Delaney & 
Honeycutt, 76; Mayo & Flynn, 
1988; Sanyal & Cohen, 04). 
- Internal and external R&D 
increase with firm size (Cohen 
& Sanyal, 04). 
Petroleum: 
- Vertical integration 
has positive effect 
on basic, applied, 
and development 
research spending 
(Armour & Teece, 
80). 
 
Electric utilities: 
- Restructuring & competition reduces overall R&D 
spending and favours short-term research to long-
term and/or collaborative research (Defeuilley & 
Furtado, 00). 
- Uncertainty has sig. neg. effect on utility R&D 
spending (Sanyal & Cohen, 04). 
- Wholesale power market has pos. (not sign.) 
effect on R&D spending. Share of customers 
eligible for switching supplier has sign. pos. 
effect. Share of customers switching has (insig.) 
neg. effect on R&D (Sanyal & Cohen, 04). 
- Uncertainty associated w. reform has negative 
effect on internal R&D, while arrival of actual 
competition has pos. sign. effect. External R&D 
increases w. uncertainty but declines w. arrival of 
competition (Cohen & Sanyal, 04). 
- Percentage of customers switching supplier has 
sign. neg. effect on internal and external R&D 
spending. Share of customers eligible for 
switching has sign. pos. effect on external R&D. 
 
R&D Intensity 
 Multi-industry: 
- R&D intensity has 
pos. effect on 
vertical integration 
(Levy, 85). 
 
 
 
 
R&D Spending 
Complementarity 
/ Trade-Offs 
  Multi-industry (incl. electric equipment): 
- Government R&D has positive effect on firms 
R&D spending (Mansfield & Switzer, 84; Becker 
& Pain, 03). 
Electric utilities: 
- Internal R&D has positive significant effect on 
external R&D spending (Cohen & Sanyal, 04). 
- Reorientation of innovation from technology 
solutions to customer-oriented products and 
organisational innovations (Markard et al., 04).  
 
 
 
 
Innovation 
Output 
Multi-industry: 
- Patents per R&D spending 
decreases w. size. But, return 
on R&D spending increases w. 
size due to cost spreading 
(Cohen & Klepper, 96). 
 Telecoms: 
- Anticipation of and actual competition reduces 
publications and increases patenting (Calderini & 
Garrone, 03a). 
Electricity equipment suppliers: 
- The slight increase in patents by electric utilities 
is considerably lower than increase in patents by 
of equipment suppliers (Jacquire-Roux & 
Bourgeois, 02). 
In
no
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n 
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Technology 
Adoption 
Electric utilities: 
- Likelihood of new technology 
adoption increases w. firm size 
(Rose & Joskow, 90).  
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Table A4: Expanded summary - innovation and ownership 
Ownership Aspect  
Privatisation & 
Private Ownership 
Mergers & 
Acquisitions 
Leverage, Investment, 
Dividend, etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R&D 
Spending 
Multi-industry: 
- Privatisation (dummy) has 
significant positive effect on 
R&D spending. Private share in 
company has significant negative 
effect on R&D spending (Munari 
& Sobrero, 03b). 
 
Privatised regulated monopoly: 
- Negative significant effect on 
R&D spending (Munari & 
Sobrero, 03b; Munari et al., 02). 
 
Multi-industry: 
- Mergers have negative effect on R&D 
spending (NSF, 89). 
 
Survey: 
- M&As among similar firms leads to 
neutral / negative effect on innovation 
input (Calderini & Garrone, 03b). 
- Merger among technologically 
substitutive firms has significant 
negative effect on R&D spending. 
Merger among technologically 
complementary firms has positive (not 
significant) effect on R&D spending 
(Calderini et al, 03). 
 
Electric utilities: 
- Pending merger has significant 
negative effect on probability of 
engaging in R&D (Sanyal & Cohen, 
04). 
Multi-industry: 
- Leverage has significant 
positive effect on R&D 
spending (Munari & 
Sobrero, 03b). 
- Investments and R&D 
spending are mutually 
(significantly) negatively 
correlated. Dividends and 
R&D spending are 
mutually negatively 
correlated. Balance of cash 
positively correlated w. 
R&D spending (Gugler, 
03). 
- Leverage (as opposed to 
acquisitions) has 
significant negative effect 
on R&D spending (Hall, 
90) 
 
 
 
 
R&D Intensity 
Multi-industry: 
- Privatisation (dummy) has 
significant positive effect on 
R&D intensity. Private share in 
company (dummy) has 
significant negative effect on 
R&D spending (Munari & 
Sobrero, 03b). 
 
Survey: 
- The increased leverage effect of 
M&As has negative impact on R&D 
intensity (Calderine & Garrone, 03b). 
Multi-industry: 
- Acquisitions result in reduced R&D 
intensity (Hitt, et al., 91). 
- Spatial dispersion in acquisitions has 
negative effect on R&D intensity 
(Shen & Reuer, 04). 
 
 
 
R&D 
Activity 
Multi industry: 
- Privatisation results in shift of 
focus toward applied and 
commercial research and 
restructuring of collaborative 
research (Munari et al., 02). 
  
 
 
Patenting 
Activity 
Multi-industry: 
- Privatisation and private share in 
firm positively correlated w. 
patenting activity (Munari & 
Sobrero, 03b). 
- Privatisation increases patents 
per researcher (Munari, 03). 
Multi-industry: 
- Decline in patenting activity after 
horizontally /technology unrelated 
acquisitions (Calderini et al, 03). 
- Acquisitions result in reduced patent 
intensity (Hitt, et al., 91). 
- M&As among similar firms leads to 
positive/neutral effect on R&D output. 
M&As among diverse firms has 
positive effect on R&D output 
(Calderini & Garrone, 03b). 
Multi-industry: 
- Number of patents applied 
for is positively correlated 
w. R&D spending (Gugler, 
03). 
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Adoption of 
New 
Technology 
Electric utilities: 
- Private utilities more likely to 
adopt new technologies (Rose 
& Joskow, 90) 
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Table A5: Expanded summary - innovation and regulation 
Regulation Aspect  
ROR 
regulation 
State vs. Local 
Regulation 
Regulatory lag & 
Incentive Regulation 
 
 
R&D 
Spending 
 
Electric utilities: 
- Targeted technology policies 
more effective than ROR in 
promoting R&D (Nelson, 84). 
- Allowing R&D in rate base 
Dummy) has a significant 
effect on R&D spending (Mayo 
& Flynn, 88). 
Electric utilities: 
- State vs. local regulation 
(dummy) not significant for 
R&D spending (Wilder & 
Stansell, 74; Delaney & 
Honeycutt, 76). 
Electric utilities: 
- Incentive regulation has 
significant negative effect on 
internal and external R&D 
spending (Cohen & Sanyal, 04). 
 
 
 
Innovative 
Activity 
  Model: 
- Level of innovative activity 
increases w. length of regulatory 
lag (Bailey, 74). 
- Regulated firm may delay or 
choose timing of adoption of 
innovation to increase profit 
across regulatory lag (Sweeney, 
81). 
 
 
 
 
Adoption of 
New 
Technology 
Model: 
ROR leads to adoption of labour 
augmenting technologies and 
under-investment in capital 
augmenting technologies  
(Smith, 74). 
 
Electric utilities: 
- ROR leads to adoption of 
labour augmenting 
technologies and under-
investment in capital 
augmenting technologies 
(Frank, 03). 
 
Gas pipelines: 
- ROR results in adoption of 
non-capital augmenting 
technologies (Granderson, 99). 
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Technical 
Change 
Electric utilities: 
- Small effect from allowed ROR 
on technical change (Nelson, 
84). 
Electric Utilities: 
- ROR results in lower rate of 
technical change than under 
deregulation and loose local 
regulation (Frank, 03; 
Granderson, 99). 
Model: 
- Rate of innovation under ceiling 
price higher than under ROR 
(Magat, 76). 
 
